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Transparency has become a prominent feature of monetary policy. This paper provides an 
overview of central bank communication practices and is the first to systematically analyze 
transparency trends throughout the world and across monetary policy frameworks. It shows 
that increases in information disclosure have not been confined to inflation targeting but 
extend to other monetary policy frameworks, although there are significant differences. In 
addition, countries with higher inflation and economic development have undergone larger 
increases in transparency. Moreover, it shows that greater transparency has been followed by 
lower average inflation. 
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Transparency has become a prominent feature of monetary policy during the last ﬁfteen
years, but systematic evidence of transparency trends has been elusive due to a dearth of
data. This paper exploits the rich transparency data set collected by Dincer and Eichen-
green (2007) to document and analyze trends in monetary policy transparency during the
last decade. It investigates not only global trends but also differences across monetary
policy frameworks. In addition, it considers the institutional and macroeconomic set-
ting of the transparency trends. Thus, it provides a wide perspective on monetary policy
transparency to enhance our understanding.
This paper establishes several stylized facts. First, it shows that there has been a
signiﬁcant increase in the disclosure of information pertinent to monetary policymaking
during the last decade. The most pronounced improvement has taken place in the com-
munication of policy decisions and the macroeconomic analysis on which they are based.
However, there are signiﬁcant differences across monetary policy frameworks in this re-
spect. Central banks with inﬂation targeting have experienced the largest expansion in
transparency, while central banks with monetary and exchange rate targeting exhibited
the smallest increases in information disclosure, although the rise in transparency during
the last decade has been signiﬁcant for all monetary policy frameworks. Countries with
high inﬂation in the late 1990s and high levels of economic development have under-
gone the strongest increase in monetary policy transparency. Furthermore, countries with
higher monetary policy transparency tend to experience lower subsequent inﬂation.
Regarding the differences across monetary policy frameworks, inﬂation targeters tend
to have low inﬂation, a high GDP per capita and the highest levels of transparency. Mon-
etary targeters generally have higher inﬂation, a low GDP per capita and low levels of
transparency. Exchange rate targeters tend to have low inﬂation, low transparency and a
varying degree of economic development. Finally, central banks without an explicit tar-
geting framework have on average an intermediate degree of transparency, with varying
levels of inﬂation and economic development.
This paper contributes to a small but inﬂuential empirical literature on transparency
practices. Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000) were the ﬁrst to document
transparency practices and other features of monetary policymaking throughout the world
in a survey of 94 central banks, but only provided a snapshot for 1998. Eijfﬁnger and
Geraats (2006) were the ﬁrst to provide systematic evidence of increases in central bank
transparency, but their index was only available for nine major central banks from 1998
to 2002. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) combined the best of both by compiling the
Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index for 100 central banks from 1998 to 2006. While Dincer and
Eichengreen (2007) ﬁnd that transparency has increased throughout the world during the
2last decade, the present paper analyzes in what respects central banks have become more
transparent.
Crowe and Meade (2008) also ﬁnd a rise in transparency but for a smaller sample of
36 countries they obtained by updating the Fry et al. (2000) transparency data for 2003. In
addition, they document a signiﬁcant increase in de jure central bank independence from
the 1980s to 2003 based on a sample of 69 countries. The presence of signiﬁcant differ-
ences in information disclosure across monetary policy frameworks was ﬁrst established
by Geraats (2006), using the Fry et al. (2000) survey data. The present paper updates and
extends this analysis using the much richer data set of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007).
There is also interesting survey evidence of central bank’s perceptions of the relevance
of transparency. The 1998 survey of 94 central banks by Fry et al. (2000) shows that
74% of central banks consider transparency a ‘vital’ or ‘very important’ component of
their monetary policy framework. In addition, based on a survey of 88 central bankers,
Blinder (2000) ﬁnds that transparency is considered a very important factor to establish
or maintain credibility, similar to a history of ﬁghting inﬂation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of the
key insights of the theoretical literature on monetary policy transparency. Section 3 re-
views two types of transparency measures that have been used in the empirical literature.
Global trends in monetary policy transparency are discussed in section 4. Differences
across monetary policy frameworks are analyzed in section 5. Section 6 considers the
institutional and macroeconomic context of the observed transparency trends. Some re-
cent challenges in monetary policy transparency are discussed in section 7, and section 8
concludes.
2 Theoretical Insights
Monetary policy transparency is typically deﬁned as a situation in which there is no
asymmetric information about monetary policymaking (e.g. Geraats 2002). This per-
tains to all the different facets of policymaking. Geraats (2002) presents a framework that
distinguishes ﬁve aspects, which has also been adopted for two important transparency
measures discussed in section 3. Political transparency refers to clarity about the cen-
tral bank’s objectives, economic transparency about the economic information used for
the policy decision, procedural transparency about the decision-making process, policy
transparency about the monetary policy stance, and operational transparency about the
effects of monetary policy implementation. It is useful to present a stylized monetary
policy model to illustrate these aspects and explain the effects of transparency.








(1 ¡ ®)(y ¡ ·)
2 (1)
where ¼ denotes inﬂation, y the output gap, ¿ the central bank’s inﬂation target, · its
output gap target, and ® the relative weight on inﬂation stabilization, with ® 2 (0;1).
The economy is described by an expectations-augmented Phillips equation:
¼ = ¼
e + y + s (2)
where ¼e denotes private sector inﬂation expectations, and s is a supply shock. In addi-
tion, there is an aggregate demand equation:
y = ¡r + d (3)
where r denotes the real interest rate, which is the central bank’s policy instrument, and
d is a demand shock.
In this model, political transparency refers to the central bank’s objectives (1), eco-
nomic transparency to the aggregate demand and supply shocks da and sa that are an-
ticipated by the central bank when it sets the policy rate, procedural transparency to the
central bank’s decision procedure (e.g. to optimally set r under discretion), policy trans-
parency to the precise policy stance r, and operational transparency to the aggregate de-
mand and supply shocks du and su that are unanticipated by the central bank when it sets
the policy rate, where " = "a +"u and "u is independently distributed with E["u] = 0 for
" 2 fs;dg.
To understand the effects of transparency, assume that the variables x 2 f¿;·;s;dg
are stochastic and independently distributed with E[x] = 0 and Var[x] = ¾2
x > 0. In
addition, the private sector rationally forms its inﬂation expectations ¼e before the central
bank optimally sets its policy rate r. As an opacity benchmark, consider the case in which
¿, ·, sa and da are only known to the central bank but not to the private sector when it
forms its inﬂation expectations ¼e. Then, substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and taking the
ﬁrst order condition with respect to r (given ¼e), it is straightforward to show that
r = ®(¼
e ¡ ¿) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)· + ®sa + da (4)
The policy rate r reﬂects both the central bank’s preferences (¿ and ·) and the macroe-
conomic shocks that it anticipates (da and sa). Substituting (4) into (3) and (2) it follows
that
y = ®(¿ ¡ ¼
e ¡ s) + (1 ¡ ®)· + ®su + du (5)
¼ = ®¿ + (1 ¡ ®)(¼
e + · + s) + ®su + du (6)
4So, the demand shock anticipated by the central bank is completely offset, and the output
gap and inﬂation depend on the central bank’s preferences (¿ and ·), the supply shock (s)
and the unanticipated shocks (du and su).
Now suppose that the central bank publishes its (medium-term) forecasts for inﬂation
and output, which equal ¼cb = ¼e¡r+da+sa and ycb = ¡r+da. This allows the private
sector to identify the macroeconomic shocks anticipated by the central bank (da and sa),
so that it can deduce the central bank’s policy preferences from the policy rate using (4).1
Thus, economic transparency helps the public to infer the central bank’s intentions from
its policy actions.
Once the outcomes for output and inﬂation have been realized, they can be used to
identify the macroeconomic shocks d and s using (3) and (2). Furthermore, disclosure
of the shocks that were not anticipated by the central bank (du and su) allows the private
sector to deduce the central bank’s policy preferences from output or inﬂation using (5) or
(6).2 Thus, operational transparency helps the public to infer the central bank’s intentions
from macroeconomic outcomes.
In general, transparency can have two types of effects, information and incentive ef-
fects (Geraats (2002, 2006)). Information effects are the direct consequences of the re-
moval of information asymmetries, such as a reduction in uncertainty. Incentive effects
are the indirect inﬂuences that stem from a change in the information structure. For in-
stance, the fact that economic and operational transparency allow the private sector to
better infer the central bank’s intentions from its policy actions and outcomes gives the




The model above could be used to investigate information effects.3 Assume for simplicity
that the central bank has perfect information (i.e. du = su = 0). Then, substituting (5)
1This presumes that the private sector knows the structure of the economy, in particular the macroeco-
nomic model used by the central bank for policy analysis. So disclosure of the latter is also important for
transparency.
2In practice, monetary policy transmission lags are longer for inﬂation than for output, so inﬂation
could be affected by supply shocks that arise after output has been realized. This means that not only the
unanticipated demand shock du but also the anticipated supply shock sa is needed to deduce the central
bank’s policy preferences from output (using y = ®(¿ ¡ ¼e ¡ sa) + (1 ¡ ®)· + du), whereas additional
information about anticipated shocks is not required to deduce policy preferences from inﬂation.
3The following analysis is similar to the model of Geraats (2007) with perfect common knowledge.
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For the opacity benchmark with asymmetric information about ¿, ·, d and s, rational














Now suppose that the central bank discloses its inﬂation target ¿ before the private
sector forms its inﬂation expectations. Then (6) implies ¼e = E[¼j¿] = ¿. Substituting













So, the publication of the central bank’s inﬂation target is beneﬁcial. The reason is that the
private sector aligns its inﬂation expectations ¼e with the target ¿, which makes it easier
for the central bank to reach the inﬂation target. This provides a powerful argument for
publishing an explicit inﬂation target, which is done by most central banks nowadays.
However, the desirability of transparency about the central bank’s preferences does
not extend to the output gap target ·. In that case, rational expectations imply ¼e =
E[¼j·] = 1¡®


















The disclosure of the output gap target · is undesirable because the private sector ra-
tionally incorporates it into its expectations. So, a higher output gap target · increases
inﬂation expectations ¼e, which leads to a higher interest rate r and depresses the output
gap y (see also (5)), thereby making it harder to achieve the target ·. In addition, the
greater volatility of inﬂation expectations harms inﬂation stabilization. This argument for
opacity about the central bank’s output preferences is similar to Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) and helps to explain central banks’ reticence about their output preferences.
Turning to transparency of macroeconomic shocks, the publication of demand shocks
d has no effect on E[W], although it would lead to smaller forecast errors for the policy
rate. However, the publication of the supply shock s is detrimental in this model. In this
case, rational expectations imply ¼e = E[¼js] = 1¡®


















Intuitively, a higher supply shock s raises inﬂation expectations ¼e, which makes it harder
to stabilize inﬂation. This drawback of transparency about supply shocks is in line with
6Cukierman (2001), although it does not incorporate beneﬁcial incentive effects discussed
below.
Providing information about future policy rates could also have beneﬁcial information
effects, since the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on longer term interest rates
that are affected by expectations of the policy path (Rudebusch and Williams 2006).
To sum up, information effects of transparency reduce uncertainty, but they are not
necessarily beneﬁcial because the private sector incorporates the information disclosures
into its expectations, which could cause greater economic volatility.
2.2 Incentive Effects
The communication of macroeconomic shocks could also have important incentive ef-
fects. As shown above, the disclosure of the demand and supply shocks anticipated by
the central bank allows the private sector to infer the central bank’s intentions from the
policy decision. This gives the central bank a strong incentive to refrain from inﬂationary
policy since it would quickly be detected by the private sector and lead to higher inﬂa-
tion expectations. Opacity about anticipated macroeconomic shocks that are reﬂected
in the policy decision makes the policy rate a noisier signal of the central bank’s in-
tentions, so that private sector inﬂation expectations are less sensitive to it, which gives
the central bank less incentive to build reputation. Thus, economic transparency reduces
the inﬂationary bias associated with discretionary monetary policy, as formally shown
by Geraats (2005). In fact, it could completely eliminate the inﬂation bias if the ad-
justment of inﬂation expectations is incorporated into the monetary policy transmission
mechanism (Geraats 2001). It also gives the central bank greater ﬂexibility to respond to
anticipated macroeconomic shocks, whereas under economic opacity the central bank no
longer completely offsets anticipated demand shocks to avoid upsetting inﬂation expec-
tations (Geraats 2000, Walsh 2007).
Similarly, transparency about unanticipated disturbances or control errors makes the
policy outcome a more accurate signal of the central bank’s intentions. This makes in-
ﬂation expectations more sensitive to unexpected policy outcomes, which again gives the
central bank a greater incentive to build reputation. Thus, operational transparency could
also reduce the inﬂation bias, as shown by Faust and Svensson (2001).
Besides beneﬁcial reputation effects on the central bank, transparency could also al-
ter the incentives of the private sector. In particular, ﬁnancial markets are likely to put
disproportionate weight on public information to coordinate their actions. Although this
could enhance the effectiveness of central bank communications, if these information
disclosures are noisy relative to the private information of investors, they could induce
greater economic volatility, as shown by Morris and Shin (2002). The stronger reliance
7on public communications also reduces the informativeness of market signals (Morris
and Shin 2005). In addition, public disclosures could crowd out private sector efforts
to acquire information and thereby reduce the net improvement in forecast accuracy
(Tong 2005).
This brief overview just highlights some important theoretical insights. A more thor-
ough review of the transparency literature is provided by Geraats (2002). For a more
recent non-technical discussion, see Geraats (2006).
3 Transparency Measures
One of the biggest impediments to transparency research has been the dearth of data. This
is not surprising since it is challenging to measure to what extent the private sector has
the same information as monetary policymakers and fully understands the policymaking
process. There are two main approaches to measuring transparency.
An inﬂuential strand of the literature focuses on ﬁnancial market reactions to mone-
tary policy decisions and communications (see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Haan and
Jansen (2008) for a recent survey). If there is perfect transparency, the absence of asym-
metric information makes imminent monetary policy decisions perfectly predictable, so
efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets should not react to monetary policy decisions. On the other
hand, ﬁnancial market reactions to central bank communications could be used to gauge
their informativeness.
This approach has the great beneﬁt of allowing very high frequency analysis of the
effects of central bank communications, but it is complicated by the fact that monetary
policy decisions are often released together with policy explanations. Furthermore, so
far the analysis has been limited to a handful of mostly developed countries. Relying on
market reactions in developing countries is more problematic since they often suffer from
ﬁnancial market inefﬁciencies.
The other approach to measuring transparency focuses on the availability of infor-
mation that is pertinent to monetary policymaking. Fry et al. (2000) provide a valuable
dataset in this respect, which is based on a survey of 94 central banks conducted in 1998.
Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2006) present an index of transparency that distinguishes ﬁve as-
pects, following Geraats (2002). They compiled it for nine major central banks from
1998 to 2002, which reveals a pronounced rise in transparency. Dincer and Eichengreen
(2007) adopt the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index and compiled it for 100 central banks from
1998 to 2006, providing the most comprehensive transparency data set to date.4 Crowe
4The Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index has 15 items, but its scoring allows for the identiﬁcation of 24 information
disclosure practices, so the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) data set effectively yields a total of 24*100*9 =
21,600 data points!






















































Note: Average of Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index over 98 observations. Source: Dincer
and Eichengreen (2007) data set.
and Meade (2008) propose an alternative transparency index that also distinguishes ﬁve
aspects like Geraats (2002), but they use the Fry et al. (2000) survey from 1998 and used
public information to update it for 40 central banks in 2003. Their index is useful since
it captures several issues differently compared to the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index. However,
it is available for a more limited sample of central banks and for only two years. In addi-
tion, the different ways in which the transparency data for 1998 and 2003 was collected
makes the change in their index a noisier measure of transparency trends. As a result,
the analysis in the present paper relies on the transparency data collected by Dincer and
Eichengreen (2007).
4 Transparency Trends
There has been a remarkable increase in monetary policy transparency during the last
decade. Figure 1 shows the average of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index across 98
central banks from 1998 to 2006, using the data set compiled by Dincer and Eichengreen
9Table 1: Trends in monetary policy transparency
1998 2006 Change (in percent point)
Transparency average 3.46 5.45 13.2%
- Political 1.74 2.06 10.5%
- Economic 0.43 0.88 15.0%
- Procedural 0.63 0.93 10.0%
- Policy 0.27 0.81 18.2%
- Operational 0.40 0.76 12.1%
Note: Unweighted average of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index across 98
central banks. The index has a maximum of 15 and 3 for the overall index and
each of its ﬁve components, respectively. Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2007)
data set.
(2007).5 The ﬁgure shows a clear upward trend in the degree of information disclosure
aboutmonetarypolicy. Thisalsoholdsforeachoftheﬁvecomponentsofthetransparency
index. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) show that the rise in transparency has not been
conﬁned to a small group of advanced countries. Although they ﬁnd that transparency
has been much higher in the developed world, the average transparency index (weighted
by the level of economic development) has increased substantially for both developed,
emerginganddevelopingcountries. Theriseintransparencyalsoextendsacrossmonetary
policy frameworks, as is shown in section 5.
Table 1 shows the average transparency index for 1998 and 2006. The average of
the overall index has risen from 3.46 in 1998 to 5.45 in 2006 out of a maximum of 15,
which corresponds to an increase of 13.2 percent point. The average scores for the ﬁve
transparency aspects (which have a maximum of 3) have also each risen by at least 10
percent point, with the largest gains in policy and economic transparency. The increases
in transparency are all statistically signiﬁcant; a paired t-test yields a p-value of less than
0.001 for the overall index and each of its ﬁve components. So, on average there has been
a highly signiﬁcant rise in monetary policy transparency for all ﬁve aspects.6
To investigate more speciﬁcally how central banks have become more transparent, the
scores for the 15 items of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index are used to deduce
whether a particular type of information is disclosed. Thus, the quantitative Eijfﬁnger-
Geraats index is inverted to obtain qualitative information about central bank disclosure
practices.
5The sample of countries is listed in the data appendix.
6ThisisincontrasttoCroweandMeade(2008), whocouldonlydetectasigniﬁcantincreaseineconomic
and policy transparency from 1998 to 2003 using their index and sample of 40 central banks.
10Table 2: Trends in information disclosure
Information disclosure 1998 2006 Change
Political transparency
- Monetary policy objectives 90 93 3
with prioritization 38 46 8¤
- Quantiﬁcation primary objective 43 62 19¤¤¤
- Explicit instrument independence 36 48 12¤¤
Economic transparency
- Numerical macroeconomic forecasts 18 56 38¤¤¤
quarterly, medium term for inﬂation and output 4 17 13¤¤¤
- Macroeconomic policy model 6 19 13¤¤¤
Procedural transparency
- Monetary policy strategy 51 67 16¤¤
- Minutes 6 16 10¤¤¤
- Voting records 5 10 5¤¤
Policy transparency
- Policy adjustment 17 53 36¤¤¤
- Policy explanation 14 43 29¤¤¤
- Policy inclination 0 3 3¤¤
Operational transparency
- Control errors operating target 10 24 14¤¤¤
- Transmission disturbances 20 46 26¤¤¤
- Evaluation monetary policy outcomes 38 63 25¤¤¤
Observations 98 98
Note: Asterisks indicate change from 1998 to 2006 is signiﬁcant at ¤ 10%, ¤¤ 5% or ¤¤¤ 1%.
Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) data set.
Table 2 shows whether central banks disclosed various types of information relevant
to monetary policymaking in 1998 and 2006, structured by transparency aspect. Re-
garding political transparency, a formal statement of monetary policy objectives is nearly
universal, with the number of central banks increasing slightly to 93 (out of 98) in 2006.
Generally, there are multiple monetary policy objectives that could be conﬂicting, but less
than half of central banks identify a primary objective or provide an explicit prioritiza-
tion, although the number increased modestly to 46 in 2006. The formal monetary policy
objectives are often fuzzy, but a large majority of central banks (62 out of 98) nowadays
present a quantiﬁcation of their primary objective(s), which constitutes a major increase
compared to 1998. Most prominently, this takes the form of a long-term inﬂation tar-
11get. More generally, the use of explicit targets or monitoring ranges for the exchange
rate, monetary aggregates or inﬂation already experienced a dramatic increase during the
1990s (Fry et al. 2000). Such numeric targets provide useful nominal anchors for private
sector expectations and performance criteria for central bank accountability.
Another issue that contributes to political transparency is the presence of explicit in-
strument independence or a central bank contract (possibly subject to an explicit override
procedure). The number of central banks that enjoy such protection from political pres-
sures has increased steadily during the last decade to nearly a majority of the sample.
However, this probably underestimates the prevalence of instrument independence be-
cause ﬁnancial markets may provide an effective deterrent to undue political interference
with monetary policy. Indeed, in the survey by Fry et al. (2000) a large majority of central
banks reported to enjoy independence without signiﬁcant qualiﬁcations.
Turning to economic transparency, the publication of forecasts or other forward-
looking analysis wasalready common in 1998 (Fry et al. 2000), butthese forward-looking
assessments were often entirely qualitative in nature. This has changed remarkably dur-
ing the last decade. The number of central banks that releases numerical central bank
forecasts for inﬂation or output has jumped from 18 to 56 in 2006. For the purpose of
economic transparency, it is important that these macroeconomic forecasts are for both
inﬂation and output, span the horizon of monetary policy transmission (typically one to
two years), and are published at least quarterly to reﬂect the latest macroeconomic data
releases. The reason is that this allows the private sector to better understand the central
bank’s monetary policy actions and infer its intentions, as explained in section 2. But in
this respect, transparency is more limited and only 17 out of 98 central banks published
their quantitative medium term forecasts for inﬂation and output every quarter in 2006,
although this constitutes a signiﬁcant increase compared to 1998. The disclosure of the
central bank’s macroeconometric model for policy analysis and forecasting has experi-
enced a similar rise from 6 to 19 in 2006. Overall, there has been a sea change in eco-
nomic transparency during the last decade with a much greater focus now on quantitative
analysis.
Concerning procedural transparency, the release of an explicit monetary policy strat-
egy has gained further ground with an increase from about one-half to two-thirds of cen-
tral banks. The strategy describes conceptually how the monetary policy instrument is
adjusted in response to economic information to reach the policy objectives. For instance,
for inﬂation targeting this typically involves adjusting the policy rate so that the medium
term forecast for inﬂation is in line with the inﬂation target. Thus, inﬂation targeting
essentially uses the medium-term inﬂation forecast like an intermediate target, implying
inﬂation-forecast targeting (Svensson 1997). Most monetary policy strategies, with the
exception of strict exchange rate targeting, leave much scope for discretion, which gives
12an important role to minutes and voting records to shed light on the decision-making
process.
There has been a signiﬁcant increase in the publication of minutes (or other compre-
hensive accounts of the monetary policy deliberations) within eight weeks, from 6 central
banks in 1998 to 16 in 2006. The minutes are generally non-verbatim and unattributed,
with the exception of reservations against the policy decision raised by dissenters, al-
though the Swedish Riksbank has recently introduced attributed minutes.7 The number
of central banks that release voting records within eight weeks has doubled but remains
low with a frequency of only 10. These could be non-attributed voting patterns or in-
dividual voting records, but the latter are only released by 5 central banks (in Hungary,
Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States). All in all, transparency about policy
deliberations remains quite scarce.
Moving on to policy transparency, a majority of central banks nowadays promptly
announce decisions to adjust the main policy operating instrument or target, and most of
them also provide an explanation, which appears to be a big change compared to 1998.8
An important feature of monetary policymaking is that the policy instrument is generally
adjusted in discrete steps, so central bankers often decide not to make a policy adjustment.
But few provide adequate explanations for all policy decisions, including when there is
no change.9 This limits transparency, since decisions not to adjust policy settings are
also important and explanations of them could help the private sector to better understand
monetary policymaking.
Since the policy instrument is adjusted in discrete steps (typically 25 basis points for
policy rates), it provides an imprecise indicator of the policy stance. For instance, central
bankers may decide to set a policy rate of 4% while their desired rate would be 4.1%.
Clearly, it would contribute to transparency to communicate this policy inclination. Fur-
thermore, since monetary policy transmission depends on expectations of future policy,
the optimal decision actually involves a path for the policy instrument. But transparency
about a policy inclination or projected policy path is very rare; in 2006 it only occurred
in New Zealand, Sweden and the United States. Nevertheless, this issue has received a
recent impetus as more central banks have started publishing their policy rate projections,
7The disclosure of verbatim transcripts of policy deliberations is considered undesirable as it could
stiﬂe a frank discussion and make monetary policymakers more reluctant to express dissenting opinions,
for instance due to career considerations (Meade and Stasavage 2004).
8Fry et al. (2000) found greater policy transparency in their 1998 survey, with 76 (out of 94) central
banks claiming to provide a prompt explanation of policy changes.
9According to the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) data for 2006, only 4 countries always provide prompt
explanations of their monetary policy decisions, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, while
Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2006) also include the European Central Bank, Swedish Riksbank and US Federal
Reserve in this respect.
13including the Czech Republic, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.
Regarding operational transparency, the number of central banks that regularly evalu-
ate control errors in achieving their operating targets has increased signiﬁcantly to about
a quarter. Central banks have also become much more forthcoming about unanticipated
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the monetary policy transmission process, in par-
ticular through regular short-term forecasts or analysis of macroeconomic developments,
which are released by about half of central banks. Yet few have the frankness to review
their past forecast errors, which would reveal unanticipated shocks.10
There has also been a large increase in the release of a regular evaluation of mone-
tary policy outcomes, to about two-thirds of central banks. But only one of them (Swe-
den) actually conducts a rigorous analysis that explicitly accounts for the contribution
of monetary policy in achieving its objectives. So, although few central banks receive
full scores according to the exacting standards of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index, many have
made progress towards greater operational transparency.
All in all, table 2 reveals a signiﬁcant increase during the last decade in the disclosure
of a broad range of information that is pertinent to understanding monetary policy. The
next section examines whether this trend has been widespread or just conﬁned to central
banks with a speciﬁc monetary policy framework.
5 Transparency Across Monetary Policy Frameworks
The phenomenon of monetary policy transparency is often associated with inﬂation tar-
geting. Indeed, the most transparent central banks in the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007)
sample have been New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada and the Czech
Republic, which are all prominent inﬂation targeters. However, the rise of transparency
also extends to other monetary policy frameworks. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 2, which
shows the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index for the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) data from 1998
to 2006 by monetary policy framework.11 The latter is based on the IMF classiﬁcation
of central banks into ‘exchange rate targeting’, ‘monetary targeting’, ‘inﬂation targeting’
and ‘other’, as of July 2006. For instance, mainland China and Hong Kong are listed as
exchange rate targeters, Argentina and Indonesia as monetary targeters, Canada and the
United Kingdom as inﬂation targeters, while the ‘other’ category includes the Euro area,
India, Japan, Russia and the United States, among others. The classiﬁcation for the ﬁnal
year of the sample (2006) is used to capture the transparency trends associated with the
monetary policy framework, whether through the (gradual) adoption or continuation of it.
10According to the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) data, only 2 central banks did so in 2006, Indonesia
and Sweden, while Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2006) also include the Bank of England.
11The sample excludes Bermuda and Cuba, for which the monetary policy framework is not available.















































Note: Average over 98 observations. Source: See data appendix.
Figure 2 shows that inﬂation targeters have on average been the most transparent,
followed by central banks without a targeting framework, while monetary and exchange
rate targeters are the least transparent. Inﬂation targeting has also generated the strongest
average increase in transparency, in particular from 1998 to 2002. Part of this is driven by
the adoption of inﬂation targeting in a number of countries, including Poland, Thailand,
Hungary, TurkeyandthePhilippines, whichareinfactthecountriesinthesamplewiththe
largest rises in the transparency index. But many inﬂation targeters continue to enhance
theirdisclosurepracticesovertime. Evenestablishedinﬂationtargeters, likeNewZealand
and the United Kingdom, further increased their transparency scores during 1998-2006.
Although the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index focuses on information that is in general perti-
nent to understanding monetary policymaking in all respects, it is natural to expect dif-
ferences in the degree of information disclosure across monetary policy frameworks. In
particular, central banks with exchange rate targeting have limited scope (if any) for inde-
pendentmonetarypolicyinthepresenceofinternationalcapitalmobility, sotheyprobably
feel far less need to explain their monetary policy actions. Central banks with monetary
targeting generally enjoy greater ﬂexibility and face the problem that monetary aggre-
gates can only be controlled imperfectly, which may make them more inclined to focus
on operational transparency. Inﬂation targeting poses a further challenge since the target
15Table 3: Transparency trends across monetary policy frameworks
Transparency average Observations 1998 2006 Change (in percent point)
Full sample 98 3.46 5.45 13.2%
- Exchange rate targeting 40 2.53 3.74 8.1%
- Monetary targeting 18 2.58 4.33 11.7%
- Inﬂation targeting 24 5.38 8.98 24.0%
- Other 16 3.94 5.69 11.7%
Note: Unweighted average across central banks of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index, which
ranges from 0 to 15. Monetary policy frameworks based on July 2006 IMF classiﬁcation. Sources:
See data appendix.
can only be controlled imperfectly after a long and variable lag of typically about two
years. This makes the communication of anticipated macroeconomic developments crit-
ical to understanding monetary policy actions, so that economic transparency becomes
more relevant.
Despite these differences, it is striking that central banks across all monetary policy
frameworks have become more transparent during the last decade. The magnitude of this
trend is highlighted in table 3, which shows the average scores of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats
transparency index for 1998 and 2006 by monetary policy framework. The average in-
crease in transparency has been around 10 percent point, except for inﬂation targeting,
which has been responsible for a average rise in transparency of 24 percent point. The
increases in transparency in table 3 are all statistically signiﬁcant; a paired t-test yields
a p-value of less than 0.001 for each of the four monetary policy frameworks. So, on
average there has been a highly signiﬁcant rise in transparency across monetary policy
frameworks.
Note that table 3 and ﬁgure 2 show the average transparency level over time based on
the monetary policy framework in 2006. So, the increase is not due to changes in com-
position (e.g. below average ‘others’ becoming above average exchange rate targeters,
raising the mean in both groups). It appears that exchange rate targeting is by far the most
popular framework, but this is probably due to the large number of (very) small open
economies in the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) sample.
To investigate which aspects of transparency have contributed to the rise during the
last decade, ﬁgures 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the decomposition of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index
from 1998 to 2006 for exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, inﬂation targeting and
other frameworks, respectively. To enhance comparability, the ﬁgures for the different
monetary policy frameworks use the same scale.
Exchange rate targeters have had the lowest average transparency scores, but raised






















































Note: Average of Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index over 40 central banks categorized as
exchange rate targeters as of July 2006. Sources: See data appendix.
them in all ﬁve aspects. The largest increase occurred for policy transparency, although it
remained below average.
Monetarytargetersexperiencedmostoftheirincreasesinpolicyandoperationaltrans-
parency. Their gain in operational transparency has been above average, which could
help managing the notorious problems associated with the control of monetary aggre-
gates. Nevertheless, they remained below the sample average in every respect except for
political transparency.
Inﬂation targeters have undergone big improvements in all aspects, but foremost in
economic and policy transparency. The strong emphasis on the former reﬂects the in-
herently forward-looking nature of inﬂation targeting that is centered around inﬂation
forecasts.
Central banks without a targeting framework, which include some of the world’s
largest economies, have also seen their strongest increases in economic transparency.
Their levels of operational, economic and policy transparency are above the sample aver-
age. Although the predilection for greater economic transparency is harder to understand
for this category, many central banks without a targeting framework essentially set a pol-
icy rate to stabilize medium term ﬂuctuations in output growth and inﬂation. This makes






















































Note: Average of Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index over 18 central banks categorized as
monetary targeters as of July 2006. Sources: See data appendix.
their policymaking quite similar to inﬂation targeting, though without the explicit inﬂa-
tion target and strategy.
All in all, it is clear that there have been substantial increases in transparency across
components for all monetary policy frameworks. To analyze more speciﬁcally how the
degree of transparency differs across frameworks, the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index is inverted
to obtain information about disclosure practices, which is shown in table 7 (included at
the end of this paper) for 2006.
Regarding political transparency, a formal statement of monetary objectives is close
to universal across monetary policy frameworks, but an explicit prioritization is much
more common among inﬂation targeters, in particular price stability as primary objective.
The same holds for a quantiﬁcation of the primary objective. In fact, all central banks
with inﬂation targeting have a numeric target for inﬂation, its most characteristic feature.
The inﬂation target often takes the form of a point with a tolerance range of about two
percentage points. Central banks without a targeting framework are quite naturally the
least likely to have a quantiﬁed primary objective. The presence of explicit instrument
independence is again most likely for inﬂation targeters but not so common for exchange
rate targeters. The latter is understandable since the lack of discretion makes instrument






















































Note: Average of Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index over 24 central banks categorized as
inﬂation targeters as of July 2006. Sources: See data appendix.
independence less relevant.
Moving to economic transparency, nearly all inﬂation targeters and a large majority
of central banks with non-targeting frameworks publish quantitative central bank fore-
casts for inﬂation or output, whereas this practice is considerably less common among
exchange rate and monetary targeters. Furthermore, about half of inﬂation targeters re-
lease their medium-term forecasts for inﬂation and output every quarter, and publish the
central bank’s macroeconomic policy model. Since inﬂation forecasts play a pivotal role
in inﬂation targeting, the central bank’s macroeconomic forecasts are often a focal point
of the central bank’s communication policy, presented in colorful fan charts that illustrate
the underlying uncertainty and balance of risks.
Turning to procedural transparency, all inﬂation targeters provide an explicit monetary
policy strategy, often explained pedagogically in the form of a rule of thumb - to adjust
the policy rate when the medium term inﬂation forecast deviates from the inﬂation target,
essentially capturing inﬂation-forecast targeting. But an explicit monetary policy strategy
is only available for a small majority of other central banks. The minutes and voting
records of the monetary policy meetings are published by about 40% and 30% of inﬂation
targeters, respectively, whereas this practice is rare among exchange rate and monetary






















































Note: Average of Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index over 16 central banks categorized as
having no targeting framework as of July 2006. Sources: See data appendix.
targeters. Thus, inﬂation targeting distinguishes itself in its much greater focus on the
communication of policy deliberations.
Concerning policy transparency, inﬂation targeters generally promptly announce any
policy adjustment and a policy explanation, but this is not so common for exchange rate
and monetary targeters. The publication of a policy inclination or projected policy path is
done by a few inﬂation targeters, but is otherwise really rare. In this respect, even inﬂation
targeters tend to remain quite opaque.
Finally, with respect to operational transparency, openness about control errors is pro-
vided by about 40% of inﬂation targeters and non-targeting central banks, while it is quite
unusual for exchange rate targeters. Information about unanticipated transmission distur-
bances is conveyed by nearly three-quarters of inﬂation targeters, but by less than a third
of exchange rate targeters. An evaluation of monetary policy outcomes is performed by
a very large majority of inﬂation targeting and non-targeting central banks, but only one
half of exchange rate and monetary targeters.
All in all, table 7 shows that inﬂation targeters generally disclose much more in-
formation about monetary policymaking than central banks with other monetary policy
frameworks, whereas exchange rate and monetary targeters tend to provide consistently
20Table 4: Correlations between central bank transparency and independence
Correlation De jure central bank independence
Overall Governor Policy Objectives Limits on lending
Transparency 0.096 0.217¤ 0.066 0.175 0.003
- Political 0.397¤¤¤ 0.483¤¤¤ 0.364¤¤¤ 0.342¤¤¤ 0.229¤
- Economic -0.082 -0.011 -0.039 0.011 -0.104
- Procedural 0.003 0.212¤ -0.023 0.079 -0.070
- Policy -0.002 -0.014 0.018 0.067 -0.033
- Operational 0.146 0.275¤¤ -0.014 0.257¤¤ 0.052
Note: Pearson correlation coefﬁcients between the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index and
the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti index of de jure central bank independence. Asterisks indicate
correlation is signiﬁcant at ¤ 10%, ¤¤ 5% or ¤¤¤ 1%. Sample: 68 central banks in 2003.
Sources: See data appendix.
less information. A Â2 test of homogeneity reveals that for nearly all the items, the dif-
ferences across the four monetary policy frameworks are highly signiﬁcant. As a result,
the monetary policy framework appears to be an important determinant of the degree of
information disclosure. This is consistent with the ﬁnding by Geraats (2006) based on
data from the Fry et al. (2000) survey, but the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) data set ex-
ploited here affords a more comprehensive and up-to-date test, which turns out to produce
more consistent and stronger results.
6 Institutional and Macroeconomic Environment
It could be argued that the trend in central bank transparency merely mirrors the move-
ment towards greater central bank independence. In particular, to avoid a democratic
deﬁcit, independent central banks are often subject to accountability requirements, which
necessitates some degree of transparency. Crowe and Meade (2008) show that there has
been a signiﬁcant increase in central bank independence from the 1980s to 2003 for both
advanced economies and emerging markets, using the index of de jure central bank in-
dependence by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) for a sample of 69 central banks.
They ﬁnd that the rise in central bank independence is signiﬁcantly positively related to
the initial level of inﬂation and democracy, and negatively to the ﬂexibility of the initial
de facto exchange rate regime.
Table 4 shows that there is a small positive correlation of 0.096 between de jure cen-
tral bank independence and central bank transparency in a sample of 68 central banks,
using the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti index that Crowe and Meade (2008) compiled for
212003 and the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats index compiled by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) for
2003. Only political transparency is signiﬁcantly positively related to the overall index
of central bank independence with a correlation of 0.397 (p-value 0.001). This is not
surprising since there is some overlap between the index for political transparency and
central bank independence, which both concern formal monetary policy objectives and
operational independence. In fact, there is a signiﬁcantly positive correlation between
political transparency and each of the four components of the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti
index, which pertain to (i) the appointment, dismissal and terms of ofﬁce of the central
bank governor; (ii) policy formulation and conﬂict resolution with the government; (iii)
objectives of the central bank; and (iv) limitations on lending to the public sector.
The component of the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti index relating to the central bank
governor has a signiﬁcant positive correlation with total, political, procedural and opera-
tional transparency. This suggests that central bank governors with long terms of ofﬁce
whose appointment and possible dismissal is protected from political inﬂuence, feel more
secure to adopt transparency. In addition, the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti sub-index for
the central bank’s objectives is signiﬁcantly positively related to political and operational
transparency. This indicates that central banks whose legal objectives are more focused
on price stability are more likely to explain deviations in macroeconomic outcomes from
their objectives.
Concerning de facto central bank independence, there is a mild negative correlation
of -0.129 (with p-value 0.286) between the 1995-2004 turnover of central bank governors
and the average level of the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index from 1998 to 2004 for
a sample of 70 central banks, with similar values for the ﬁve components of the index.
All in all, there is only a positive relation between transparency and central bank in-
dependence with respect to the governor and monetary policy objectives, ignoring the re-
lation with political transparency that is due to direct overlap. Moreover, there appears to
be no relation between central bank independence and policy and economic transparency,
which are the components that have shown the largest increase during the last decade.
This suggests that the rise in transparency is not simply a counterpart of greater central
bank independence.
This raises the question what may be the reasons behind transparency improvements.
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) analyze the determinants of transparency using cross-
section and panel-data regressions and ﬁnd that the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index
is increasing in GDP per capita, openness and the ﬂexibility of the de facto exchange
rate regime, while the level of past inﬂation has no signiﬁcant effect. In addition, there
is a positive cross-section relation with governance measures, in particular voice and ac-
countability, and government efﬁciency. Crowe and Meade (2008) run a cross-section
regression for 40 countries (12 of which are in the euro zone) and also ﬁnd that their
22Table 5: Transparency trend correlations
Correlation 1998 inﬂation log GDP per capita
Transparency change 1998-2006 0.356 [0.000] 0.139 [0.185]
- Political 0.438 [0.000] 0.028 [0.793]
- Economic -0.032 [0.763] 0.361 [0.000]
- Procedural 0.199 [0.059] -0.005 [0.963]
- Policy 0.120 [0.259] 0.116 [0.267]
- Operational 0.390 [0.000] -0.076 [0.470]
Observations 91 94
Note: Pearson correlation coefﬁcients with p-values in square brackets. Coefﬁcients in bold
are signiﬁcant at 5%. Sources: See data appendix.
transparency measure for 2003 is positively related to exchange rate ﬂexibility and gov-
ernance measures for regulatory quality and voice and accountability. Furthermore, they
include the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti index of central bank independence (which partly
overlaps with their transparency measure) and (not surprisingly) ﬁnd a strong positive
relation, while GDP per capita has no signiﬁcant effect.
To explore the macroeconomic context of the observed transparency trends, table 5
shows the correlation between the change in (components of) the Eijfﬁnger-Geraats trans-
parency index from 1998 to 2006 and two key macroeconomic variables, the level of in-
ﬂation and log GDP per capita in 1998. The initial level of inﬂation is strongly positively
correlated with the subsequent increase in the transparency index. The effect is highly
signiﬁcant, also for political and operational transparency. These correlation coefﬁcients
remain signiﬁcant when a transformed level of inﬂation is used to reduce the sensitivity
to outliers.12 Thus, it appears that higher inﬂation induces greater transparency, in par-
ticular about the monetary policy objectives and about unanticipated transmission shocks
that cause inﬂation outcomes to deviate from the central bank’s intentions. In addition,
the level of GDP per capita is positively related to the transparency increase, especially
for economic transparency which has a highly signiﬁcant correlation. This suggests that
more advanced countries have adopted greater transparency, in particular by releasing
their macroeconometric model and forecasts. The latter impose considerable demands on
the technical expertise of central bank staff, which may be challenging to meet for some
developing countries.
Another issue is the level of inﬂation following the adoption of transparency. Table
6 shows that the levels of transparency in 2003 are negatively correlated with subsequent
12To be precise, the transformation is ¼=(100 + ¼), where ¼ is inﬂation in percent. The 1998 level of
inﬂation in the sample ranges from -1.3% (in Barbados) to 84.6% (in Turkey), with an average of 9.8%.
23Table 6: Correlations between transparency and inﬂation
Correlation Average inﬂation, 2004-2007
Full sample Excl. FX targeters
Transparency in 2003 -0.408 [0.000] -0.604 [0.000]
- Political -0.208 [0.046] -0.416 [0.001]
- Economic -0.436 [0.000] -0.610 [0.000]
- Procedural -0.334 [0.001] -0.466 [0.000]
- Policy -0.346 [0.001] -0.477 [0.000]
- Operational -0.261 [0.012] -0.454 [0.000]
Observations 92 58
Note: Pearson correlation coefﬁcients with p-values in square brackets. Coefﬁ-
cients in bold are signiﬁcant at 5%. Exchange rate (FX) targeters are identiﬁed
based on de facto IMF classiﬁcation as of 30 June 2003. Sources: See data
appendix.
average inﬂation from 2004 to 2007. The correlations are all signiﬁcant. These results
are robust to the choice of the sample period for subsequent average inﬂation.13 However,
the correlations become insigniﬁcant and sometimes even slightly positive when the av-
erage of inﬂation is taken over the preceding period from 1998 to 2002. In addition, it is
interesting that the correlation coefﬁcient is (robustly) largest for economic transparency,
which may explain why this aspect of transparency has proved so popular among central
banks.
When exchange rate targeters are excluded from the sample, the correlations between
transparency and subsequent average inﬂation become notably stronger and all highly sig-
niﬁcant. This would be expected based on the theory discussed in section 2. Transparency
exerts a disciplinary effect on discretionary monetary policymaking, which reduces the
inﬂation bias and the sacriﬁce ratio. But this argument does not apply to exchange rate
targeters, since their commitment to exchange rate stability constrains their monetary pol-
icy actions so transparency exerts little effect. Indeed, the correlation between the 2003
level of transparency and 2004-2007 average inﬂation for the group of 34 countries with
exchange rate targeting is only -0.075. For monetary targeting and inﬂation targeting the
correlations are considerably stronger, -0.253 and -0.203, respectively, though not statis-
tically signiﬁcant due to their small sample sizes. Countries with other monetary policy
frameworks exhibit the strongest correlation, -0.563 with a p-value of 0.003.
13In particular, they also hold for average inﬂation in the periods 2004-2006, 2005-2006 and 2005-2007.
Note that the year 2003 is chosen for the transparency data because it is the ﬁrst year for which the IMF
classiﬁcation of monetary policy frameworks is available.
24Figure 7: Relation between transparency and inﬂation.







































Note: Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index for 2003. Sample: 92 central banks. Sources:
See data appendix.
The contribution of the different monetary policy frameworks to the negative rela-
tionship between transparency and inﬂation is illustrated in ﬁgure 7. Average inﬂation
during the period 2004-2007 was quite low for the 92 countries in the sample, ranging
from 0% (in Japan) to 14% (in Zambia), with a sample average of 5.7%. Countries with
exchange rate targeting tend to have low levels of transparency and average inﬂation.
Their commitment to an exchange rate target allows them to secure low inﬂation with lit-
tle transparency. Countries with monetary targeting also have low levels of transparency
but typically higher average inﬂation. Inﬂation targeters, on the other hand, generally
combine high levels of transparency with low average inﬂation. Finally, countries with
other monetary policy frameworks vary considerably in their levels of transparency and
average inﬂation, exhibiting a strong negative correlation.
There is also a strong association between the level of transparency and (log) GDP
per capita in 2003, with a correlation of 0.556 (with p-value 0.000). A signiﬁcant re-
lation persists for each monetary policy framework, with a coefﬁcient [and p-value] of
0.411 [0.014], 0.631 [0.037], 0.408 [0.074] and 0.699 [0.000] for exchange rate targeting,
monetary targeting, inﬂation targeting, and others, respectively.
The contribution of the different monetary policy frameworks to the positive rela-
tionship between transparency and GDP per capita is illustrated in ﬁgure 8. It shows
25Figure 8: Relation between transparency and GDP per capita.
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Note: Eijfﬁnger-Geraats transparency index for 2003. Sample: 93 countries, 2003. Sources:
See data appendix.
that countries with monetary targeting tend to have a low GDP per capita and low trans-
parency, whereas inﬂation targeters generally enjoy higher levels of GDP per capita and
transparency. Countries with exchange rate targeting or non-targeting frameworks show
greater variation in both the level of economic development and monetary policy trans-
parency.
All in all, these results provide some stylized facts. The long term transparency trend
is positively related to the initial level of inﬂation and the level of economic development.
Countries with higher monetary policy transparency tend to experience lower subsequent
inﬂation. Inﬂation targeters tend to have low inﬂation and high GDP per capita, while the
reverse holds for monetary targeters.
Of course, this descriptive exploration of the macroeconomic environment cannot es-
tablish cause and effect. However, there have been several econometric studies of the
macroeconomic effects of transparency. Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2002) use the
Fry et al. (2000) survey and ﬁnd that average inﬂation is signiﬁcantly decreasing in the
extent to which central banks publish forward-looking analysis and forecasts, controlling
for institutional characteristics (such as central bank independence and political instabil-
ity) and macroeconomic features (like GDP per capita and openness). But the negative
relation between inﬂation and forecast transparency does not hold for countries with an
exchange rate peg. These ﬁndings are consistent with the theory discussed in section 2,
26which predicts that economic and operational transparency have a beneﬁcial incentive
effect that reduces the inﬂationary bias of discretionary monetary policy. Furthermore,
Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2003) ﬁnd that greater transparency lowers the sacri-
ﬁce ratio.
Ball and Sheridan (2003) argue that the greater reduction in inﬂation for inﬂation tar-
geters simply reﬂects regression to the mean. It is true that after temporary price shocks,
inﬂation tends to revert back to ‘underlying’ or ‘core’ inﬂation. However, high levels of
core inﬂation generally do not magically vanish without the concerted efforts of central
bankers. The argument of regression to the mean by Ball and Sheridan (2003) is difﬁ-
cult to reconcile with the fact that many countries have suffered from persistently high
inﬂation.
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) exploit their panel data set and ﬁnd that transparency
has a signiﬁcant negative effect on the variability of inﬂation and output, controlling for
macroeconomicfeatures(includingopenness, ﬁnancialdepthandpastinﬂation)andusing
instrumental variables (in particular, the rule of law) to take into account possible endo-
geneity of transparency. Crowe and Meade (2008) ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive relation
between their transparency measure and the relative accuracy of private sector forecasts
forinﬂation. vanderCruijsenandDemertzis(2007)ﬁndthatgreatertransparencytendsto
make private sector inﬂation expectations less sensitive to past inﬂation outcomes. There
is also evidence that transparency improves the predictability of monetary policy actions
(e.g. Gerlach-Kristen 2004, Swanson 2006).
Overall, the empirical evidence so far indicates that monetary policy transparency
largely has had beneﬁcial macroeconomic effects.
7 Transparency Challenges
While there has been a pronounced increase in the transparency of monetary policy over
the last decade, considerable challenges remain. This section brieﬂy discusses three is-
sues: the (sometimes misguided) focus of central banks on (short-run) predictability; the
communication of policy deliberations and the role of press conferences; and the publi-
cation of the projected policy path.
Monetary policy transparency refers to the absence of asymmetric information about
monetary policymaking. So, a transparent central bank is predictable. Some central banks
seem to believe that the converse also holds - that a predictable central bank must be
transparent. However, monetary policy actions could be predictable even without trans-
parency. For instance, there could be a very stable macroeconomic environment so that
the policy rate does not have to be adjusted. Or a central bank could clearly signal the next
policy decision in advance, like the trafﬁc-light system of code word communication of
27the European Central Bank (ECB), which is discussed by Geraats, Giavazzi and Wyplosz
(2008). Thus, ﬁnancial markets may manage to conﬁdently predict the next policy move
without really understanding monetary policymaking.
Although the predictability of monetary policy actions certainly has merits, it should
not be considered an end in itself. In particular, it is important not to distort monetary
policy actions to achieve predictability, but rather to use central bank communications
to this effect. For instance, by delaying policy decisions to avoid market surprises it
becomes harder for the public to understand the central bank’s monetary policy reaction.
As a result, a focus on short-term predictability could actually undermine monetary policy
transparency, harm credibility and reduce predictability in the medium and long run.
To understand monetary policymaking it is invaluable to have the minutes of the mon-
etary policy meetings, which is an area where secrecy still prevails. Minutes shed light
on the arguments that were discussed and the policy options that were considered. In
addition, the voting records would be very useful.14 In particular, the direction of dissent-
ing votes provides information about the policy inclination, while the number of dissents
indicates the likelihood of a policy move in that direction. Thus, the publication of vot-
ing records improves short-run predictability of policy decisions, as shown by Gerlach-
Kristen (2004). Furthermore, dissenting voices provide an indication of the ambiguity of
the macroeconomic signals, which allows the public to better understand the monetary
policy reaction. As a result, the publication of minutes and voting patterns enhances the
medium term predictability of monetary policy.
Some central banks do not release minutes but hold a press conference after the mon-
etary policy meeting (e.g. Norges Bank and the ECB). This could in principle be an
adequate and even more timely substitute for minutes. Moreover, the question and an-
swer session could identify transparency gaps. However, the value of press conferences
is limited when the central banker’s responses are reticent. In addition, the ability to
appropriately ﬁeld questions about delicate monetary policy issues requires considerable
communication skills. So, it is preferable to remedy transparency gaps through controlled
releases rather than risking slips of the tongue.
Last but not least, the frontier in monetary policy transparency – the publication of
the projected interest rate path. Since the effect of a monetary policy decision depends
on expected future decisions, the projected policy path is an integral part of the monetary
policy stance. It provides an important tool for central banks to inﬂuence market expec-
tations and thereby enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. But the communication
14Some central banks claim to decide ‘by consensus’ (although they legally should decide by simple
majority), but evidence from central banks that publish voting patterns shows that disagreements about
monetary policy decisions are very common (Geraats et al. 2008), which suggests that consensus decision-
making suppresses dissent or at least fails to communicate it.
28of the projected policy path poses an important challenge unlike other macroeconomic
forecasts. Since the policy rate is directly controlled by the central bank, the projected
path could be confused for a commitment. So, it is vital to convey the underlying uncer-
tainty, which is most effectively done in a fan chart. In addition, it is helpful to publish the
path for a short run (e.g. three-month) interest rate which is not the policy instrument of
the central bank to prevent the interest rate path from being perceived as a commitment.
Although the publication of the projected interest rate path yields a beneﬁcial infor-
mation effect as it reduces uncertainty (Rudebusch and Williams 2006), there could be a
detrimental incentive effect similar to Morris and Shin (2002). In particular, the projected
interest rate path requires assumptions about how ﬁnancial markets react to deviations
from their expectations. Since central banks may not be very accurate gauging these ﬁ-
nancial market reactions, the projected interest rate path could be quite noisy so that its
publication could induce greater economic volatility. In addition, the reliance of ﬁnancial
markets on the published path to coordinate their actions would reduce the informative-
ness of market signals (Morris and Shin 2005). Nevertheless, when market expectations
differ signiﬁcantly from the projected interest rate path, the central bank could greatly
beneﬁt from publishing it to facilitate the alignment of expectations and increase the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy.
8 Conclusions
While a few decades ago central banks were often notorious for their secrecy, nowa-
days they tend to pride themselves on their degree of transparency. In fact, central bank
communications have become an important tool for monetary policymaking. This pa-
per establishes three stylized facts about monetary policy transparency around the world
during the last decade.
First, there has been a remarkable rise in the disclosure of information pertinent to
monetary policymaking. Although there has been greater openness in many respects, the
most pronounced increase has been in the communication of policy decisions and the
macroeconomic analysis on which they are based.
Second, there are signiﬁcant differences in the degree of information disclosure across
monetary policy frameworks. Central banks with inﬂation targeting have experienced the
highest average level and increase in transparency, whereas monetary and exchange rate
targeters have exhibited the lowest level and increase in information disclosure. Central
banks without an explicit targeting framework have had intermediate levels and increases
in transparency. Nevertheless, all monetary policy frameworks have seen a signiﬁcant
increase in information disclosure during the last decade.
Third, the increase in transparency has been signiﬁcantly positively correlated with
29the initial level of inﬂation and the level of GDP per capita. Furthermore, there is a
signiﬁcantly negative correlation between monetary policy transparency and subsequent
inﬂation.
So, it looks like central banks have used transparency to improve credibility and re-
duce inﬂation, which is in line with theoretical arguments. It is also consistent with
econometric ﬁndings in the literature that monetary policy transparency makes inﬂation
expectations less sensitive to past inﬂation outcomes, reduces average inﬂation and the
sacriﬁce ratio, limits the variability of inﬂation and output, and also makes monetary pol-
icy more predictable. Thus, a central bank that invests in its communication tools could
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Although the level of transparency has generally increased, the types of information
central banks tend to disclose systematically depend on their monetary policy framework.
In particular, exchange rate targeters have remained relatively opaque. This is likely
because the lack of discretion reduces beneﬁcial incentive effects of transparency. Mon-
etary targeters have improved most in terms of transparency about unanticipated control
errors and transmission disturbances, which are known to be important in this framework.
Although inﬂation targeters have greatly increased transparency in all respects, their em-
phasis has been on the disclosure of anticipated macroeconomic disturbances, which is
in line with the forward-looking nature of this framework. As a result, the differences in
transparency reﬂect the characteristics of the monetary policy frameworks.
All in all, the paper shows a rich variety in disclosure practices over time and across
monetary policy frameworks. Although central banks have adopted greater transparency
in many respects, they remain opaque in some areas, in particular the disclosure of in-
formation about policy deliberations and policy inclinations. This is not surprising since
there can be considerable communication challenges. But some central banks appear to
have overcome them successfully, which may inspire others to follow suit. Thus, the trend
in monetary policy transparency is likely to continue.
309 Data Appendix
² Central bank independence: Cukierman et al. (1992)index of de jure central bank
independence, compiled by Crowe and Meade (2008) for 99 central banks for 2003.
² GDP per capita: Real gross domestic product per capita in 2003 (PPP converted, in
current prices, in USD). Source: Penn World Table, version 6.2 (Heston, Summers and
Aten 2006); for the Euro area, ECB Statistics Pocket Book, June 2005.
² Inﬂation: Annual CPI inﬂation in percent. Source: IMF International Financial
Statistics.
² Monetary policy framework: Exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, inﬂation
targeting or other based on de facto framework. Source: IMF Classiﬁcation of Exchange
Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/index.asp).
² Transparency: Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2006) index for central bank transparency,
ranging from 0 to 15, compiled by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) for 100 central banks
from 1998 to 2006.
² Sample: Albania; Argentina; Armenia; [Aruba]; Australia; The Bahamas; Bahrain;
Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belize; Bhutan; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; China
(Mainland); Colombia; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; [East Caribbean];
Egypt; El Salvador; Estonia; Ethiopia; Euro area; Fiji; Georgia; Ghana; Guatemala;
[Guyana]; [Hong Kong]; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; [Iraq]; Israel; Jamaica;
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea; Kuwait; [Kyrgyz Republic]; Latvia; Lesotho;
[Libya]; Lithuania; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia;
[Namibia]; New Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; [Oman]; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Peru;
Philippines; Poland; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Sierra Leone; Sin-
gapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Sudan;
Sweden; Switzerland; [Tajikistan]; Thailand; Trinidad And Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey;
Uganda; Ukraine; [United Arab Emirates]; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay;
Vanuatu; Yemen; Zambia.
This is the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) sample excluding Bermuda and Cuba, which
are not included in the IMF classiﬁcation of monetary policy frameworks. The 11 coun-
tries in square brackets are not in all the samples due to limited availability of data.
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